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This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical 
disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical 
thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems 
for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical 
judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been 
taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in 
cognitive and non-cognitive contents between parties of deep ethical disagreement 
challenges both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself. 
 
1. Specification problems 
Ethical judgments come in a wide variety. We make not only judgments about 
what to do or feel, but also about moral obligation, wrongness, permissibility, 
justice, blameworthiness, and virtue. Almost all analyses of some specific kind of 
ethical judgment fall into three broad categories, specifying what it is for a state to 
be of that particular kind based either on (i) its cognitive content, (ii) some non-
cognitive attitude, or (iii) some combination of both (see the chapters on 
Cognitivism and non-cognitivism and Hybrid expressivism). But such 
specifications have proven elusive, as ethical judgments of a given kind vary both 
with respect to features closely associated with cognitive content and with respect 
to accompanying non-cognitive attitudes. In this section, we look first at the 
specification problem for analyses in terms of judge-invariant cognitive contents, 
before turning to the corresponding problem for analyses appealing to non-
cognitive attitudes.  
 
The invariantist cognitivist’s specification problem. A simple cognitivist analysis of ethical 
judgments of a given kind (e.g. judgments that an action is morally wrong) 
identifies them with judgments about whether something has a certain moral 
property (e.g. the property of moral wrongness). But ethical relativists have 
thought that at least in cases of deep and systematic ethical disagreement, the 
parties are concerned with different properties (different properties of moral 
wrongness, say), making judgments with different cognitive contents. If relativists 
are right, there is a certain sense in which ethics is subjective rather than objective: a 
judgment’s cognitive content might vary between judges. In what follows, I will 
first specify the relevant idea of invariant cognitive content, before explaining how 
invariantist analyses are threatened by deep ethical disagreement. 
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 Sometimes the relevant notions of invariant and variant cognitive contents are 
understood in terms of truth-values: the contents are invariant if and only if the 
judgment is true or false independently of who made it, otherwise variant. 
However, on some minimalist, expressivist or relativist views about truth, this will 
fail to draw the relevant kind of distinction. On such views, to say that a judgment 
is true might merely reflect one’s agreement with it, or the sense that it satisfies 
one’s own fundamental standard of acceptance for such judgments. 
Correspondingly, the claim that the truth-values of a class of judgments are judge-
independent might not reflect the assumption that people are concerned with the 
same aspect of reality. It might instead reflect a policy of holding these judgments 
to the same fundamental standards independently of whose judgments they are, a 
policy that might be in place in order to lead to coordination of attitudes (e.g. 
Blackburn 1993; 1998; Ridge 2014, ch. 7; Björnsson 2015).  
 To avoid this complication, the invariance of cognitive content at stake is 
better characterized in terms of relations between what different judges are trying to 
get right when making their judgments, and conditions under which they succeed in 
their judgmental endeavor. The key idea is that judgments about the same judge-
independent matter have the same success conditions, independently of who is 
making the judgment. Suppose that Arith and Metic each tries to determine the 
product of 936 and 724. If they make the same judgment, it follows that if Arith’s 
effort was successful, so was Metic’s, and that if Arith’s effort was a failure, so was 
Metic’s. For contrast, consider judgments of personal taste. Suppose that both Gus 
and Tibus feel peckish, and that each tries to determine whether there is 
something tasty in the vending machine. What each is trying to get right, we can 
plausibly assume, is whether there is something in the machine that accords with 
his taste. Then even if they both judge that there is something tasty in the machine, 
one of them might have made a successful judgment while the other has not, and 
if they judge differently, they might nevertheless both have been successful; they 
might simply have different taste preferences. 
 In line with this, I will understand invariantism about the cognitive content of 
a kind of judgment as follows:  
 
COGNITIVE INVARIANTISM: For any two judges A and B, if both A and B 
judge that X is F, or both judge that X is not F, then if one is (un)successful in 
her judgmental endeavors, so is the other. 
 
(Correspondingly, variantism says that success conditions vary between judges.) 
Importantly, we can see that both Gus and Tibus have judged successfully even if 
we do not agree with both their judgments, and thus do not want to say that both 
judgments are true. Attributions of judgmental success might thus come apart 
from agreement and attributions of truth (Björnsson 2015). 
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 Arguably, COGNITIVE INVARIANTISM about ethical judgment—henceforth just 
“invariantism”—captures views that have been assumed or defended by a variety 
of historical figures, including Plato, Hume, and Kant, as well as by most 
contemporary self-described moral realists. Invariantism can also be endorsed by 
some philosophers who take moral judgments to be commitments to act or feel 
rather than ordinary beliefs, but who think that the formation of such judgments 
involve commitments to satisfy strong judge-invariant constraints (see e.g. Hare 
1981, cf. Korsgaard 1996). 
 Notice that invariantism is only indirectly connected to the semantics of the 
language used to express ethical judgments. First, invariantism might be true even if 
ethical discourse employs context-dependent expressions. For example, consider 
the fact that terms like “ought”, “should”, “right”, “wrong”, and “good” seem to 
be context dependent. To say that something is wrong seems to be to say that it 
violates some relevant norm, but which norm varies from context to context: it 
might be a moral norm, a norm of etiquette, some professional procedural norm, 
or some grammatical rule, among others. (For recent extended defenses of 
metaethical contextualism, see e.g. Wedgwood 2007; Finlay 2014. Cf. the chapter 
on Contextualism.) But such context dependence, or a corresponding context-
dependence in thought, does not rule out that when people judge that something 
is morally wrong, they always relate to the same norm (i.e. the same univocal moral 
norm), thereby making judgments with the same success conditions.  
 Second, invariantism might fail even if judgments are expressed using terms 
with invariant descriptive contents. Suppose, for example, that “immoral” has 
invariant content in English. It might still be that the corresponding terms in other 
languages—the terms naturally translated to “immoral” in English—have other 
referents. For, as many have suggested, translation need not go by referential 
content, as opposed to, say, role in practical deliberation (e.g. Hare 1952, ch. 9; 
Wong 1984: 73; Blackburn 1991: 5–9; Copp 2000; Björnsson and McPherson 
2014). If so, invariantism might fail across linguistic communities for kinds of 
judgments that are naturally described as judgments about what is immoral. What 
judges in the other communities are trying to get right when making such 
judgments is whether something has the property referred to by their term. 
 If invariantism is true for a given kind of ethical judgment, we could provide 
an elegant (though perhaps partial) characterization of such judgments by 
pointing to their success-conditions. But invariantism about any widely 
instantiated kind of ethical judgment seems to be a highly ambitious contingent 
claim: it says that all judgments of that kind have identical success conditions. As 
such, it is in need of substantial support. 
 The need for such support is especially pressing in light of deep and seemingly 
intractable ethical disagreement. As is generally recognized, the problem is not 
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that intractable disagreement is incompatible with invariantism, as it might be due 
to the complex and difficult nature of a topic, combined with motivated reasoning 
(e.g. Brink 1989; Shafer-Landau 2003; Huemer 2005). What puts invariantism in 
question, rather, is that some ethical disagreements seem to be grounded in 
different fundamental conceptions of the subject matter as well as in 
responsiveness to systematically different features of reality (see e.g. Westermarck 
1932; Wong 1984; Gibbard 1990; Wong 2006; Prinz 2007). For example, take 
disagreements about our obligations to people in need, such as the poor or sick in 
our own community, or refugees seeking asylum from war. Some of these 
disagreements might be grounded in disagreements about non-moral matters, 
perhaps concerning positive or negative effects of help on those who give or 
receive it. But other disagreements are more fundamentally moral, being 
grounded in different conceptions of what is owed to others given that helping has 
certain effects. These disagreements might seem to involve primitive or 
fundamental differences concerning what ultimately grounds obligations: 
hypothetical contractual agreements, certain methods of moral thinking, 
enlightened self-interest, or certain sets of values, rights, reasons, or norms, say. 
Given that we often take fundamental conceptions as (defeasible) guides to what 
people have in mind, this variation seems to provide (defeasible) evidence that the 
parties are making judgments with different success conditions. Unless there is 
significant evidence for invariantism, variantism seems the better bet. 
 What sort of positive evidence might there be? The most popular argument 
for invariantism points to features of ethical discourse and thinking that are 
characteristically instantiated by paradigmatically invariant domains but at best 
partially instantiated in paradigmatically variant domains. For example, in asking 
ethical questions, we are typically not satisfied with answers explicitly relativized to 
different judges or ethical systems. We also typically take even judges with 
radically different moral views to be in disagreement, rather than merely seeing 
things from different perspectives. Non-cognitivists and relativists have proposed 
explanations of these phenomena. In the next section we will look specifically at 
attempts at variantist-friendly explanations of disagreement, and we have already 
mentioned the possibility of pragmatically motivated policies of holding ethical 
judgments to the same judge-independent standard: such policies might explain 
why relativized answers to ethical questions are unsatisfactory. But many 
invariantists have found assumptions required for these explanations ad hoc. They 
have therefore endorsed something like the following argument (see e.g. Brink 
1989, ch. 2; Smith 1994; Shafer-Landau 2003, chs. 2–3; Streiffer 2003, ch. 1; 
Huemer 2005, chs. 2–3; Enoch 2011, ch. 2): 
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THE STRAIGHTFORWARD ARGUMENT:  
(i) Ethical discourse and thinking display features characteristic of 
paradigmatically invariantist domains.  
(ii) Invariantism can explain or make sense of these “invariantist” features in 
whatever way they are explained in paradigmatically invariantist domains, 
thus requiring no ad hoc assumptions. 
(iii) Non-invariantist (variantist or non-cognitivist) explanations of 
“invariantist” features require ad hoc assumptions.  
(iv) Invariantism thus offers the more straightforward way of explaining or 
making sense of these features. 
 
Though popular, THE STRAIGHTFORWARD ARGUMENT seems to have limited 
force (Björnsson 2012; cf. Tersman 2006, ch. 5; Loeb 2007). Obviously, premise 
(iii) is undermined if there is good independent motivation for non-invariantist 
explanations (as many non-invariantists think). Moreover, premise (i) might be at 
odds with studies suggesting that people often reject the idea that at least one of 
the judgments constituting moral disagreement must be incorrect (Sarkissian et al. 
2011; Beebe 2014; Khoo and Knobe Forthcoming). 
 Less obviously, but of significant dialectical importance, premise (ii) would 
seem to be undermined if we lack independent positive evidence for invariantism. 
If displays of “invariantist” features in ethical thought and talk have not been 
responsive to such evidence, some special story would be needed about how 
invariantism explains or makes sense of these features. We cannot merely assume 
that it would be more straightforward than the non-invariantist alternatives. 
Moreover, if we could make plausible that the features have been responsive to 
independent positive evidence, it is unclear how much further support is added by 
THE STRAIGHTFORWARD ARGUMENT. 
 So what other sources of evidence might there be for invariantism? The 
striking variation in conceptions most saliently involves certain substantial natural 
(psychological, sociological, physical) or supernatural properties that judges take to 
determine whether something has a certain ethical property. This leaves open the 
possibility that there is agreement at some other, more fundamental, level. G. E. 
Moore (1903) famously thought so. On the one hand, he claimed that 
 
OPEN QUESTION: Any description of an object in naturalistic or 
supernaturalistic terms leaves open and intelligible the question whether 
something satisfying that description has a given ethical property. 
 
Given this, no exhaustive naturalistic or supernaturalistic conception of ethical 
properties is necessary for making the relevant ethical judgments. (For discussion 
of Moore’s “open question argument”, see the chapter on Conceptual Analysis 
and Metaethics.) On the other hand, Moore thought that judges have a non-
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naturalistic or irreducibly normative conception of ethical properties (Moore 1903, ch. 
1; cf. Shafer-Landau 2003; Huemer 2005; Parfit 2005: 330–32). Perhaps that 
conception could ground invariantism. 
 Before assessing that possibility, consider a different way in which invariantism 
might be true in spite of deep ethical disagreement. Moore took OPEN QUESTION 
to show that ethical properties cannot be natural or supernatural properties 
because he assumed that a judge’s conception of a referent reveals its nature. 
However, many have rejected that assumption (e.g. Putnam 1975; Burge 1979; 
Kripke 1980; Millikan 1984; Boyd 1988; Railton 1989; Smith 1994; Jackson 1998; 
Millikan 2000). Without it, OPEN QUESTION does not rule out that parties of deep 
ethical disagreement have the same non-relative natural (or supernatural) property 
in mind when judging whether an action is obligatory. 
 There are various ways in which this might be true. One possibility is that 
judges always have some procedural conception of ethical properties in mind. For 
example, perhaps all judges are committed to correctly applying principles that 
would be identified in a process of reflective equilibrium given access to the 
relevant non-normative facts (cf. Jackson 1998: 131–35; Brink 2001; Merli 2002; 
Schroeter and Schroeter 2009: 11–15). Another is that in judging whether 
something is, say, morally wrong, one is necessarily concerned with whether it 
belongs to the same kind as paradigmatic instances of moral wrongness, or has the same 
ethical property as these instances, whatever that property is. Yet another is that 
in judging whether something is morally wrong, one intends to be concerned with 
whatever others making wrongness judgments are best understood as concerned 
with. That intention could help ensure de jure that success conditions are 
coordinated (Schroeter and Schroeter 2009). On each of these possibilities, the 
conceptions guaranteeing sameness of reference—the reference fixing conceptions—
leaves open the fundamental nature of the property in question, thus leaving room 
for deep substantial disagreements. 
 Yet another possibility is that invariantism is guaranteed by factors at least 
partly external to judges’ conceptions of the property in question (cf. the discussion 
of internalist and externalist metasemantic theories in ch. 34). One version of this 
externalist possibility is that success conditions of judgments are determined by the 
etiological function of the concepts involved: A judgment that X is (not) F is 
successful if and only if X has (lacks) the property such that prior successful 
tracking of that property explains why we make judgments about what is and is 
not F and why they play the role they play in our psychology (e.g. Millikan 1984; 
2000). Even if judges themselves have no exhaustive conception of what it is for 
something to be F (to be water, say), the ability to make such judgments might 
itself have a determinate enough function to provide an account of judgmental 
success. Along these lines, Richard Boyd (1988; 2003) famously suggested that the 
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term “good” (when used in moral contexts) is best seen as referring to the property 
of being conducive to human flourishing. Another possibility is that success-
conditions for moral judgments are determined by what judges commit themselves 
to in virtue of the practical role of these judgments. This proposal starts with the 
assumption that moral judgments involve various action-directed attitudes 
(preferences, decisions), and adds that rational agents are committed to certain 
constraints on such attitudes: constraints of universality, equal concern, coherence, 
or self-determination, say. These constraints, it is then argued, provide exhaustive 
success conditions for our moral judgments (see e.g. Smith 1994; Korsgaard 1996; 
Wedgwood 2007; Korsgaard 2009). 
 All of these suggestions indicate how invariantism might be true in spite of deep 
ethical disagreement. But it is another matter to make plausible that it is in fact 
true. To do so, it is not enough to make plausible that success conditions for kinds 
of ethical judgment obey some universal constraints. The constraints have to be 
exhaustive. If they merely provide some necessary or sufficient condition for 
judgmental success, individual judgments might involve further necessary or 
sufficient conditions, and so still differ in success conditions. Because of this, 
evidence for invariantism often seems elusive:  
 
Non-naturalistic conceptions: Suppose that judging whether something is morally 
wrong presupposes that one understands the ethical property in question as a 
non-natural property. Even so, it is unclear why we should assume that 
disagreeing parties have the same non-natural property in mind. When judges 
have very different conceptions of what natural properties make an act wrong, 
this assumption seems particularly problematic (see e.g. Björnsson 2012: 386–
87; cf. Eklund 2012). 
 
Procedural conceptions: Suppose that judgments of justice aim at verdicts that are 
in line with the upshots of a process of reflective equilibrium. Even so, judges 
might understand such a process in different ways, admitting different inputs 
or prescribing different kinds of revision, thus yielding different views of justice. 
Given variations in what parties of deep moral disagreement take as evidence 
or as admissible forms of argument, it is unclear why we should assume that 
they operate with the same exhaustive procedural conceptions.  
 
Rational practicality constraints: Suppose that kinds of ethical judgment involve 
specific action-directed attitudes. Even so, few have been convinced that there 
are rich enough judge-invariant constraints on the relevant attitudes to 
account for what we are trying to get right when making moral judgments (see 
e.g. Enoch 2006). 
  
Sameness of kind: Suppose that all judgments of moral wrongness aim to 
determine whether the object in question is of the same kind as paradigm 
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cases of moral wrongness. Even so, the idea that something is of the same kind as 
something else is itself unclear—things can be  alike and different along many 
different dimensions—and judges might have different kinds of sameness in 
mind. An etiological account of reference like Boyd’s might avoid this 
problem as it relies on external tracking relations rather than judges’ 
conceptions of sameness in kind. But Boyd himself takes seriously the 
possibility that ‘good’ tracks different and incompatible modes of human 
flourishing, thus leaving room for a certain kind of relativism (cf. Wong 1984), 
and other attempts to apply related accounts of reference to ethical judgments 
have suggested that properties tracked will vary between judges (Gibbard 
1990, ch. 6). 
 
Sameness de jure: Suppose that judges intend to be concerned with whatever 
others are concerned with when judging whether something has a certain 
property. Even so, this intention might not be best understood as fixing 
reference to a judge-invariant property (Björnsson 2012: 387–89). It would 
seem to leave open what counts as a best interpretation and whether the best 
interpretation of what others are concerned to get right is itself invariantist (as 
in the case of arithmetic) or variantist (as in the case of tastiness), or perhaps 
non-cognitivist (as when we try to jointly decide what to do). 
 
Because of difficulties like these, the jury is still out on whether some form of 
invariantism is both compatible with and supported by the evidence. To my mind, 
we currently have little positive reason to think that central kinds of ethical 
judgment have some specific set of judge-invariant exhaustive success conditions. 
As a consequence, we also have reason to reject THE STRAIGHTFORWARD 
ARGUMENT: absent readily available evidence for invariantism, there is no 
straightforward invariantist explanation of “invariantist” features of ethical talk 
and thought. Defenders of invariantism cannot just assume that explanations from 
other domains carry over to ethical judgments. 
 
The non-cognitivist’s and cognitive variantist’s specification problem: Suppose that what 
unifies ethical judgments of a certain kind and distinguishes them from other kinds 
is not some invariant cognitive content. How, then, should the different kinds of 
judgment be specified? Here the best-known proposals appeal to non-cognitive 
attitudes such as desires or preferences. On typical non-cognitivist views, ethical 
judgments are identified with such states: to think that it would be good that 
something happen is to desire or prefer that it be the case, say (see the chapter on 
Cogntivism and Non-Cognitivism). On a typical cognitive variantist view, it is 
instead to think that it has a certain property, P, where P is the property the judge 
prefers that events have (Dreier 1990). 
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 Though both non-cognitivist and cognitive variantist strategies avoid the 
invariantist’s specification problem, they face a related two-pronged challenge. 
First, there are many kinds of ethical judgment, each requiring its own 
specification. Second, not any non-cognitive attitude can constitute the judgment 
or fix the property that a given judgment concerns: a sports fan upset with a 
team’s tactical choice or a critic finding aesthetic fault with a performance does 
not thereby think that it is morally wrong. 
 To distinguish among kinds of ethical judgment, further specifications of the 
relevant non-cognitive attitudes are needed. For the case of moral wrongness 
judgments, some have suggested that judgments of moral wrongness involve 
commitments to moral blame (indignation, guilt) (Gibbard 1990). Others have 
suggested that such judgments involve the idea that sanctions of some kind 
(punishment, public opinion, conscience) ought to be in place (Mill 1863: 71), and 
some proposed that these judgments have a special etiology, being 
characteristically based on certain kinds of emotionally engaged processes 
(Kauppinen 2010). The problem is that such proposals seems to either over- or 
underdiscriminate. Surely one might think that there ought to be sanctions against 
actions of a certain kind without thinking that these actions are morally wrong, or 
think that an action is wrong without having engaged in the sentimentalist 
processes characteristic of human beings, or without being committed to having 
certain reactive attitudes (Miller 2003; Merli 2008; Björnsson and McPherson 
2014)? More radically, motivational externalists deny that any non-cognitive 
attitude is required (e.g Svavarsdóttir 1999). 
 Much as it is unclear what cognitive content might be in common between all 
people making judgments of moral wrongness, it is thus unclear whether they 
involve some common non-cognitive attitude capable of constituting the judgment or 
fixing the property it concerns. In response to this variation, one strategy has been 
to embrace a form of variantism about the relevant non-cognitive attitude. On this 
view, attributions of ethical judgments are inherently flexible because flexibility is 
required for normal moral judgments to serve their practical function, namely to 
coordinate attitudes. This purpose, the suggestion goes, is best served if we engage 
people who make judgments sufficiently similar to the normal cases (Blackburn 
1991: 5–9; Björnsson and McPherson 2014). A potential problem for this sort of 
proposal, apart from capturing just the right amount of flexibility, is that it seems 
difficult to explain ethical disagreement between parties whose judgments involve 
neither a shared cognitive content, nor a shared non-cognitive attitude (Sturgeon 
1991: 25–27; for a response, see Björnsson and McPherson 2014). To assess that 
worry, we need to understand the nature of disagreement and attributions of 
disagreement. 
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2. Disagreement problems 
In the previous section, we saw how variations within specific kinds of ethical 
judgment create difficulties for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist analyses. In 
this section, we look at how attributions of disagreement raise problems for 
variantist cognitivism, before considering non-cognitivist and other non-orthodox 
attempts to understand ethical disagreement. 
 
Arguments against variantist cognitivism: At least at first glance, it might seem that,  
 
IMPLIED CONTRADICTION: If A says, “X is wrong”, and B says, “X is not 
wrong”, B has contradicted A. 
 
Claims like IMPLIED CONTRADICTION have been taken to undermine accounts 
according to which the referent or satisfaction conditions of “wrong” might vary 
between utterances (see e.g. Moore 1912: 100–01; cf. Hare 1952: 148–50; Smith 
1994: 32–35). For example, the proposal that “wrong” just means in violation of S, 
where S is whatever standard the speaker endorses, fails to guarantee that B has 
contradicted A: if A and B endorse different standards, X might violate A’s 
standard but not B’s, rendering both claims correct. Given IMPLIED 
CONTRADICTION, our simple analysis of “wrong” thus seems mistaken. Moreover, 
since IMPLIED CONTRADICTION seems equally plausible when “permissible”, 
“right”, “good”, and other ethical terms are substituted for “wrong”, similar 
arguments can be raised against variantist analyses of these. 
 A qualification is in place. The term “wrong” can be used to convey thoughts 
not only about moral wrongness, but also about inappropriateness relative to 
various non-moral goals, aesthetic standards, and so forth. Focusing on moral 
wrongness specifically, it is furthermore common to distinguish between prima facie 
and all things considered moral wrongness, as well as between subjective wrongness 
(relative to the agent’s evidence) and objective wrongness (relative to all non-moral 
facts). IMPLIED CONTRADICTION is implausible if A is concerned with moral 
wrongness and B with aesthetic wrongness, or if A and B are concerned with 
different kinds of moral wrongness. Though such complications are rarely 
discussed in relation to disagreement arguments of this sort, the arguments make 
best sense if we take the utterances to concern the same kind of wrongness, such as 
all things considered subjective moral wrongness. 
 Similar arguments against variantist cognitivism have been proposed in terms 
of disagreement in judgment rather than contradiction. The following seems as 
reasonable as IMPLIED CONTRADICTION (assuming the qualification just 
introduced): 
 
IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT: If A judges that X is wrong and B that X is not 
wrong, they disagree.  
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However, on analyses of “wrong” given which A’s and B’s judgments might have 
compatible success conditions, IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT cannot be explained 
merely in terms of the cognitive content of the two judgments (see e.g. Moore 
1912: 100–01 (on “difference in opinion”); Gibbard 1990, ch. 1; Horgan and 
Timmons 1991; Smith 1994: 32–35). 
 For those operating with an orthodox cognitivist understanding of 
disagreement, IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT has seemed not only to undermine 
variantist cognitivism, but also to straightforwardly support invariantism. 
Consider: 
 
ORTHODOX DISAGREEMENT: For two judges to disagree is for them to make 
judgments with incompatible success conditions. 
 
To ensure orthodox disagreement between any two judges A and B, the judgment 
that X is wrong and the judgment that X is not wrong must have incompatible 
success conditions independently of whose judgments they are. But non-cognitivists have 
argued that no plausible cognitivist account of the meaning of “wrong” guarantees 
that success conditions for wrongness-judgments are judge-independent. Given 
this and given IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT, it instead seems that ORTHODOX 
DISAGREEMENT must be false: disagreement must be explained in some other way 
(Stevenson 1937). (A tempting alternative formulation of the orthodox account is 
in terms of incompatible truth- or correctness conditions. As already noted, 
however, studies indicate that people confidently attribute disagreements without 
confidently thinking that one judgment must be incorrect. See e.g. Sarkissian et al. 
2011; Beebe 2014; Khoo 2015; Khoo and Knobe Forthcoming.) 
  Recently, arguments from disagreement have most famously been invoked 
against causal-regulatory forms of cognitivism of the sort advocated by Richard 
Boyd (see e.g. Blackburn 1991; Horgan and Timmons 1991; Smith 1994). In 
Horgan and Timmons’ version, we are faced with two groups of judges: people on 
Earth and people on “Moral Twin Earth”. The normative vocabularies of the two 
people play similar practical roles. Here on Earth, considerations about what is 
“wrong”, “right”, “good”, and so forth guide action and motivation; Moral Twin 
Earthlings have terms playing the corresponding practical roles. However, since 
the terms of the two groups are relevantly causally regulated by different 
properties, they have different referents according to Boyd’s theory. Against this 
background, Horgan and Timmons claim that if disagreement arises between the 
groups, the parties are best understood as disagreeing “in moral belief and 
normative moral theory, rather than … in meaning” (1991: 460). From this they 
conclude that Boyd’s cognitivism is mistaken. 
 Notably, Horgan and Timmons do not presuppose that both parties make 
judgments of wrongness, rightness, value, and so forth, and so do not appeal 
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directly to claims like IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT. Instead, they take the features of 
the case—in particular the fact that the terms in question play the same practical 
role as our terms—to make it plausible that judges in the two communities 
disagree in moral judgment. From that intermediate conclusion, however, the 
argument follows the model of arguments from IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT: since the 
target cognitivist account suggests that the parties make judgments with 
compatible success conditions, it leaves us with no explanation of why these 
judgments constitute disagreement. Moreover, given that intuitions of 
disagreement are grounded in the practical role of the terms involved, the case 
might seem to suggest that these terms should be understood along non-cognitivist 
lines. 
 Some critics of the Moral Twin Earth argument have objected that intuitions 
about such cases are unreliable guides to the nature of the judgments or claims 
involved because of the highly theoretical content of these intuition and the 
unusual nature of the cases in question (see especially Dowell Forthcoming). This 
criticism might have less force against disagreement arguments building on more 
familiar cases than that of Moral Twin Earth, but raises important questions 
about the methodology of semantic analysis. 
 Others have argued that disagreements of the sort figuring in Horgan and 
Timmons’ scenario have little bearing on the content of the terms involved. Most 
commonly, the suggestion has been that the cognitivist can follow non-cognitivists 
in taking the disagreement at hand to be grounded in the practical role played by 
the terms, while nevertheless denying that this practical role is part of their content, 
strictly speaking. (Sayre-McCord 1997; Copp 2000; Merli 2002; Björnsson and 
Finlay 2010, ch. 6; Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Finlay 2014).  
 Some of these replies have appealed to specific mechanisms of conversational 
pragmatics, arguing that disputes in ordinary language are often best understood 
as practically motivated attempts to impose a certain normative perspective 
(Björnsson and Finlay 2010) or as expressions of metalinguistic disagreement 
about how the terms involved should be used in certain contexts where this use 
has practical implications (Plunkett and Sundell 2013). If proponents are right that 
the pragmatic mechanisms in question play prominent roles outside of ethics,  we 
have independent reason to resist inferring that some predicate “F” has context-
invariant content from the fact that one party’s assertion, “X is not F”, seem to 
contradict another’s assertion, “X is F”, or from the fact that the parties seem to 
disagree. More has to be said to ground that inference. 
 It is less clear that these pragmatic proposals are enough to explain the 
seeming plausibility of IMPLIED CONTRADICTION or IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT 
understood as perfectly general claims. Unless whatever it is that grounds 
contradiction and disagreement necessarily accompanies the utterances or 
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judgments involved, contradiction and disagreement are not guaranteed. But it is 
unclear how non-cognitive attitudes or metalinguistic views can be such necessary 
companions if utterances and judgments are understood purely in terms of their 
cognitive content.  
 To better understand whether and how non-invariantist accounts of moral 
language or moral judgments can make sense of IMPLIED CONTRADICTION and 
IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT, we would be helped by a more general understanding of 
what might ground contradiction and disagreement if orthodox cognitivist views 
fail to account for all cases. Such an understanding would also be help us 
determine whether these two claims have perfectly general scope, or whether their 
intuitive appeal can be explained in terms of factors that only typically accompany 
the utterances or judgments in question.  
 
Non-orthodox accounts of disagreement and contradiction: Suppose that invariantism is false 
or that, as our discussion in the Section 1 suggested, we lack clear evidence for it. 
Then unless the intuitive appeal of claims like IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT is mistaken 
or epistemically irresponsible, our understanding of these claims seems to operate 
with a non-orthodox notion of disagreement. 
 The best-known non-orthodox proposal understands ethical disagreement in 
terms of conflicts in non-cognitive attitudes:  
 
CONFLICTING ATTITUDES: A and B disagree if A is in favor of p and B is in 
favor of q, where p and q cannot be simultaneously realized (see e.g. 
Stevenson 1963: 2). 
 
The account is structurally similar to ORTHODOX DISAGREEMENT, providing a 
tempting explanation of why both kinds of relations would be understood as 
disagreement. It also seems to straightforwardly capture central cases of ethical 
disagreement: characteristically, someone judging that an action morally ought to 
be done is in favor of doing it, and someone judging that it morally ought not to 
be done is in favor of not doing it. Moreover, though originating in a non-
cognitivist tradition, CONFLICTING ATTITUDES might be employed by accounts 
that deny that non-cognitive attitudes are semantically implicated in moral 
judgments and moral claims.  
 Appealing as it is, however, CONFLICTING ATTITUDES is too weak, as 
illustrated by cases like  (cf. Ridge 2013: 46–7): 
 
Mere Clash: A wants C to sell an apartment to A and B wants C to sell that 
apartment to B. Though both A and B might be disappointed if C decides to 
sell to the other, neither would have any objection to such a decision, nor be 
opposed to it in any other way.  
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Here it is clear that A’s and B’s attitudes conflict, but unclear whether they 
disagree about anything. 
 The standard way of strengthening CONFLICTING ATTITUDES is to add an 
element of opposition between the parties, spelled out in terms of higher-order 
attitudes, as when C. L. Stevenson requires that neither party be “content” to let 
the other’s first-order attitude be unchanged (Stevenson 1937: 27; cf. Blackburn 
1998: 14, 69). However, this proposal threatens to be either too week or too strong. 
On one reading, to say that the parties are not content with the other’s attitude is 
to say that they prefer that the other have a different attitude. But this is plausibly 
already part of Mere Clash, and still seems insufficient for disagreement. On 
another reading, inspired by Stevenson’s illustrations of his proposal, 
disagreement requires active effort to change the other’s mind, or perhaps 
willingness to engage in such efforts (see e.g. Schafer 2012). This would make it 
harder to deny that there is disagreement, but this requirement seems too strong. 
Though willingness or effort to change the other’s mind might be necessary 
conditions for the activity of disagreement, two people can disagree in judgment 
without having any active interest in changing the other’s mind. (A similar 
problem faces Gibbard’s (2003, ch. 14) suggestion that disagreement is partly a 
matter of choice.) 
 Even without amendment, CONFLICTING ATTITUDES also seems too strong to 
capture all cases of ethical disagreement. One problem is that of “amoralists”: of 
people whose attitudes are not aligned with their moral judgments. Motivational 
externalists insist that such people are possible, and many motivational internalists 
accept that misalignment is possible under abnormal conditions (see the chapter 
on Ethical Judgment and Motivation). If moral judgments can be made without 
accompanying non-cognitive attitudes, it seems clear that there can be moral 
disagreement without clashes of attitudes. But CONFLICTING ATTITUDES also runs 
into trouble with less controversial cases: 
 
Neutrality: A thinks that it would be better if C φ rather than not, whereas B 
thinks that C’s φ-ing and not φ-ing are morally on a par, neither being 
morally better than the other. A’s and B’s attitudes are well aligned with their 
moral judgments: A prefers that C φ, whereas B is neutral or indifferent with 
respect to C’s φ-ing.  
 
Here B would have nothing against C’s acting in accordance with A’s preferences. 
Nonetheless, there is a clear disagreement about whether φ-ing and not φ-ing are 
morally on a par. One might think that this is instead explained by a conflict in 
second-order attitudes, but we have already seen some difficulties for that 
suggestion. (For further problems with the Stevensonian account of disagreement, 
see Ridge 2013.) 
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 Perhaps there are ways of amending these shortcomings. The problem is to do 
so without excessive ad hoc tinkering. Ideally, an account of ethical disagreement fits 
with a general understanding of why a variety of differences in psychological states 
constitute disagreement while others do not. On the one hand, we find 
disagreement in a variety of domains, both paradigmatically objective (arithmetic) 
and paradigmatically subjective (tastiness). On the other hand, two people do not 
disagree merely by having conflicting preferences or imagining incompatible 
states-of-affairs, nor does someone thinking that an object is to the right disagree 
with someone thinking that it is to the left if they judge from different spatial 
perspectives. As CONFLICTING ATTITUDES covers only non-cognitive 
disagreement, it seems ill suited to give us a unified understanding of what 
distinguishes cases of disagreement from cases of mere difference. Moreover, it 
already needs further amendments to handle Mere Clash and Neutrality, and it is 
unclear how it can account for disagreements in various non-normative subjective 
domains where clashes in attitude are non-obvious, such as disagreement about 
what is tasty (but see Marques and García-Carpintero 2014). Because of this, we 
might want to look elsewhere.  
 One place to look is at literature focusing on linguistic disagreement 
phenomena rather than on disagreement in judgment. A central observation in 
this literature has been that we naturally employ expressions of disagreement 
(“no”, “I disagree”) also in response to paradigmatically “subjective” or judge-
relative claims, such as claims about what might be the case, or about what is or 
isn’t tasty: 
 
Tasty: 
A: This soup is really tasty. 
B: No, it’s too salty.  
 
In Tasty, A makes a claim based on her personal taste reaction, but it seems that B 
can felicitously contradict or express disagreement with what A has said based on 
her own, different, taste reaction. Often, observations like these have been made 
in defense of the suggestion that the claims involved have assessor-relative acceptance 
conditions, and so might be competently accepted by the speaker but rejected by 
someone with a different palate (for gustatory taste claims), different evidence (for 
epistemic modals), or different norms (for moral claims) (e.g. Lasersohn 2005; 
Egan 2007; Stephenson 2007; Egan 2010; 2012; Schafer 2012; Willer 2013; 
MacFarlane 2014; Björnsson 2015; Khoo and Knobe Forthcoming). (Assessor-
relativist accounts should be distinguished from accounts taking the acceptance 
conditions to vary with context of utterance. See the chapters on Contextualism 
and Relativism.) These proposals explain the sense of contradiction in variantist 
discourse when combined with something like the following: 
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CONTRADICTION: One utterance contradicts another if and only if fully 
accepting the former involves rejecting the latter. 
 
For example, even if the judgments expressed by A and B in Tasty have judge-
relative success conditions, to fully accept A’s claim is to judge, oneself, that the 
soup is really tasty, which is to reject B’s claim.  
 CONTRADICTION seems to apply equally well to ethical discourse given an 
intuitive understanding of what it is to accept various ethical claims. If A says “X 
is morally wrong” and B says, “X is not morally wrong”, to fully accept A’s claim 
would seem to involve rejecting B’s: whether understood in invariantist, cognitive 
variantist, or non-cognitivist terms, judging that something is wrong should 
involve rejecting the idea that it isn’t wrong. CONTRADICTION thus seems to 
vindicate a version of IMPLIED CONTRADICTION.  
 The idea that certain kinds of claims have assessor-relative acceptance 
conditions is relatively recent, and it is still unclear how it is best developed. One 
question concerns why certain utterances have assessor-relative acceptance 
conditions. Another concerns the extent to which data conform to assessor-
relativist predictions, as assessors do not always accept or reject claims in the 
relevant domains based on their own information, palate, or norms (e.g. 
Stephenson 2007; von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Björnsson and Finlay 2010). For 
example, if a small child points towards the sauce in the pan, saying, “that’s tasty”, 
a parent who very much likes the sauce but believes that it is too spicy for the child 
can felicitously reply, “no dear, it’s too spicy”, contradicting the child’s claim and 
expressing disagreement. 
 One explanation for both the existence of assessor-relative acceptance 
conditions and exceptions like these could be that conversational pragmatics 
determines what sort of assessment is called for. If claims of various kinds have 
pragmatic points—to inform about some objective fact, guide the taste 
expectations of others, or affect their moral attitudes, say—then for hearers to go 
along with that point means forming the corresponding beliefs, expectations, or 
attitudes. For some claims—ordinary claims about judge-independent reality—the 
point is to convey a belief with a certain hearer-independent representational 
content. For other claims, the point is to convey non-representational attitudes or 
hearer-relative representations. If we understand accepting a claim as a matter of 
going along with its conversational point, we would then have an explanation of 
why certain claims have assessor-relative acceptance conditions (e.g. Stephenson 
2007; Egan 2010; 2012; Willer 2013; cf. Stalnaker 2002). This could also explain 
why it is sometimes natural or even mandatory to take the speaker’s perspective 
even in characteristically assessor-relative domains. Sometimes such assessments 
might simply be more in line with the point of the conversation, as when the child 
needs taste guidance in relation to its own palate rather than that of its parent 
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(Björnsson and Almér 2010: 23–26, 29–32; Björnsson and Finlay 2010: 19–24, 
28–34; Finlay 2014, ch. 8; Björnsson 2015).   
 Whether and in what form such pragmatic stories are successful, they do not 
directly provide an account of disagreement in judgment between parties that are not 
engaged in conversation, nor, perhaps, willing to engage. But one possibility is 
that disagreement in judgment consists in a certain potential for discursive 
disagreement:  
 
DISAGREEMENT FROM CONTRADICTION: For A and B to disagree is for A and 
B to be in states characteristically expressed using contradictory utterances 
(Björnsson 2015). 
 
This suggestion might solve problems faced by CONFLICTING ATTITUDES. First, it 
does not seem to overgenerate disagreement in Mere Clash: it is not clear what 
contradictory claims the parties can make merely in virtue of their conflicting 
attitudes. Second, it seems to handle Neutrality: A’s and B’s judgments can be 
characteristically expressed by “φ-ing is morally better than not φ-ing” and “φ-ing 
and not φ-ing are on a par”, respectively. But fully accepting the first of these two 
claims would seem to involve rejecting the other, whether moral judgments are 
understood along non-cognitivist or variantist cognitivist lines. (On a non-
cognitivist account, for example, accepting the first might be to morally prefer φ-
ing over not φ-ing, whereas accepting the latter might be to morally prefer neither 
to the other (cf. Dreier 2009).) Given CONTRADICTION, DISAGREEMENT FROM 
CONTRADICTION thus seems to ensure that A and B disagree. It also seems to 
straightforwardly handle disagreement about what is tasty, relying on the 
treatment of Tasty offered by CONTRADICTION. Finally, the idea that ethical 
judgments are characteristically expressed with conversational points other than to 
convey some assessor-independent fact seems compatible with a variety of non-
invariantist solutions to the specification problem discussed in Section 1. (For a 
structurally similar account of disagreement in terms of potential to give conflicting 
advice rather than potential to make contradictory claims, see Ridge 2013.)  
 Though DISAGREEMENT FROM CONTRADICTION might look promising, any 
explanation of disagreement in judgments in terms of expressions of these 
judgments might seem to get the order of explanation wrong. Moreover, for 
DISAGREEMENT FROM CONTRADICTION to apply to deep moral disagreement 
along the lines just sketched, it requires some solution to the non-invariantist’s 
specification problem from Section 1. The question about how to understand 
disagreement in non-invariantist discourse generally and moral disagreement 
specifically is thus still very much an open one.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, we saw how deep ethical disagreements and 
variations in non-cognitive attitudes create difficulties for attempts to characterize 
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specific kinds of ethical judgment. In this section, we have seen how attributions of 
disagreement have been taken to undermine cognitive variantist accounts. But we 
have also seen how the lack of clear evidence for invariantism as well as 
disagreement in paradigmatically non-invariantist domains suggest that we 
intuitively countenance disagreement that does not conform to the orthodox 
cognitivist model. Though it is still unclear what non-orthodox theory of 
disagreement best accounts for such disagreement phenomena, the very existence 
of non-orthodox disagreement undermines simple inferences from the existence of 
a disagreement to the cognitive content of the judgments that seem to ground that 
disagreement.  
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